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Abstract
With the rapid growth in the development of smart devices equipped with biometric sensors, client identification system using biometric traits
are widely adopted across various applications. Among many biometric traits, fingerprint-based identification systems have been extensively
studied and deployed. However, to adopt biometric identification systems in practical applications, two main obstacles in terms of efficiency and
client privacy must be resolved simultaneously. That is, identification should be performed at an acceptable time, and only a client should have
access to his/her biometric traits, which are not revocable if leaked. Until now, multiple studies have demonstrated successful protection of client
biometric data; however, such systems lack efficiency that leads to excessive time utilization for identification. The most recently researched
scheme shows efficiency improvements but reveals client biometric traits to other entities such as biometric database server. This violates client
privacy. In this paper, we propose an efficient and privacy-preserving fingerprint identification scheme by using cloud systems. The proposed
scheme extensively exploits the computation power of a cloud so that most of the laborious computations are performed by the cloud service
provider. According to our experimental results on an Amazon EC2 cloud, the proposed scheme is faster than the existing schemes and guarantees
client privacy by exploiting symmetric homomorphic encryption. Our security analysis shows that during identification, the client fingerprint data
is not disclosed to the cloud service provider or fingerprint database server.
c⃝ 2016 The Korean Institute of Communications Information Sciences. Publishing Services by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Biometric identification is one of the most prominent meth-
ods for identifying an individual. All biometric traits, such as
fingerprint, iris, and retina, share the important factors of uni-
versality (people have their own fingerprint), uniqueness (the
probability that two persons have the same fingerprint is negli-
gible), and permanence (biometric traits usually do not change
over time) [1]. Such properties have certain pros and cons. Al-
though they make the usage of biometric traits easy and client
identification precise, they raise concerns for client privacy. For
example, suppose Alice identifies herself using her fingerprint
to access some web services, such as a health-care service and
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the transmission of her fingerprint and discern her private infor-
mation including health condition and registered SNS identity.
This severely violates client privacy. Furthermore, if Alice’s fin-
gerprint data is revealed to the public, anyone can masquerade
as Alice by simply submitting her fingerprint data, thereby in-
validating the entire identification system [2,3]. As biometric
traits are unique and cannot be changed during the lifetime,
once leaked, they cannot be revoked and re-generated.
Recently, several studies [4,5] have proposed privacy-
preserving fingerprint identification systems, which use an
asymmetric homomorphic encryption algorithm to encrypt the
fingerprint data so that only key owners can access their fin-
gerprints. Although the systems guarantee privacy-preserving
identification, the computation cost of the encryption algorithm
is considerable. Thus, they are not scalable considering the
growing number of clients.
Yuan et al. [6] introduced an efficiency-improved fingerprint
identification scheme that exploits matrix operations to encrypt
fingerprint data, thus avoiding heavy computations compared
with the schemes using the asymmetric encryption algorithm.
es. Publishing Services by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the
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Further, most computations are shifted from a server onto a
third-party entity (e.g., a cloud) to exploit their resources. Nev-
ertheless, there is a trade-off between efficiency and privacy,
that is, they must assume that the server has the authority to
access the fingerprint database. We stress that such assumption
must be alleviated considering irrevocability of biometric data.
For example, a malicious employee with access to the finger-
print database may sell a copy of the data to someone, or the
server could be compromised, thus rendering the data unrecov-
erable.
In this paper, we propose an efficient privacy-preserving
fingerprint-based identification scheme. Compared with Yuan
et al.’s scheme [6], our scheme exploits a symmetric homo-
morphic encryption algorithm in biometric identification, thus
achieving both security and efficiency. We allow the server to
outsource most computations to a cloud to save storage cost
and improve efficiency so that fingerprints are secure.
2. System description
2.1. System model
The proposed scheme consists of three entities: a client, data
server (a server for short), and cloud (see Fig. 1). The client
encrypts and enrolls his/her fingerprint. For identification, the
client encrypts and sends a newly scanned fingerprint to the
cloud. Note that the previous key used to enroll is not re-used
but a fresh key is generated at every identification to encrypt the
fingerprint.
We adopt a filterbank-based fingerprint matching system [7],
which is also used in other biometric identification schemes.
This system [7] promises high accuracy by using FingerCode:
a chain of N -independent feature codes that are typically
8-bit integers. This is used to measure the Euclidean distance
between two fingerprints.
2.2. Threat model
We assume that attackers reside outside the system and
attempt to eavesdrop on the data sent from a client. The goal
of these attackers is to obtain a client’s raw biometric data,in this case, the fingerprint. The attackers can then bypass
the identification process and successfully access the data
server. As mentioned earlier, biometric traits are incapable of
being revoked when leaked. Therefore, it is important that the
biometric data is secured from attackers.
We define the cloud as an honest-but-curious entity,
implying that it behaves properly in most cases but attempts
to harvest biometric information. In addition, we postulate that
the cloud may collude with an outside adversary to recover a
client’s fingerprint data to gain illegal profits. We assume that
the data server is also curious about fingerprint data. A data
server providing service to a client does not necessarily imply
that it is allowed to access the client’s fingerprint data.
2.3. Design goal
Our goal is threefold. First, during enrollment and identifi-
cation, fingerprint data should not be revealed to any entities
including the server and the cloud. Next, the proposed scheme
should be able to filter out malicious clients who submit ran-
dom values similar to legitimate clients’ FingerCodes. Lastly,
the identification regarding computation and communication
should be efficient.
3. The proposed scheme
3.1. Preliminaries
Let Enc(·) be a homomorphic encryption function. Then,
for any given encryption key k, the encryption function satisfies
Enck(m1 ▹ m2) ←− Enck(m1) ◃ Enck(m2), for some
operators ▹ and ◃ on input messages m1 and m2. The
encryption scheme is said to be additively homomorphic if
the following equation holds, given two encrypted messages,
Enck1(m1) and Enck2(m2):
Enc(k1+k2) (m1 + m2) = Enck1 (m1)+ Enck2 (m2) . (1)
We use a secret key k = [k1, . . . , kN ] to encrypt the FingerCode
m = [x1, . . . , xN ] as follows:
Encki (x1) = x1 + k1 mod M, (2)
...
EnckN (xN ) = xN + kN mod M, (3)
where M is a randomly-chosen large integer satisfying 0 ≤
xi < M .
3.2. Initial client enrollment
The first client has FingerCode m1 = [x11, . . . , x1N ] and
a random key k1 = [k11, . . . , k1N ]. He encrypts m1 such that
Enck1 (m1) = [x11 + k11 mod M, . . . , x1N + k1N mod M].
The client then sends the encrypted file to the server, which
re-encrypts the file by using the key pair (ks1, k′s1). Note that
neither key is permanent, instead they are used only for the en-
rollment of the first client. The server computes Encks1+k′s1(0)
and re-encrypts Enck1 (m1) to generate Enck1+ks1+k′s1 (m1),
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Fig. 3. An example of subsequent client enrollment process when n = 2.
which the server then sends to the cloud. Next, the client, server,
and cloud establish a secure channel among them to run a sim-
ple key-exchange protocol. First, the client sends k1+r1, where
r1 = [r11, . . . , r1N ] is a random number vector, to the server.
The server adds ks1 to k1 + r1 and sends the result to the cloud.
Next, the client sends r1 directly to the cloud. By subtracting r1,
the cloud acquires k1 + ks1 without knowing individual keys.
After the first client registration is complete, the cloud contains
k1 + ks1, Enck1+ks1+k′s1 (m1) , Encks1+k′s1(0). The initial client
enrollment process is depicted in Fig. 2.
3.3. Subsequent client enrollment
We first show the second client enrollment process and then
generalize it for the nth client. The second client generates a
randomly chosen key k2 and encrypts m2. The encrypted data
Enck2 (m2) is sent directly to the cloud. Next, the client chooses
and sends a random number vector r2 to the server, which first
generates a new key pair (ks2, k′s2), computes r2−

ks1 + k′s1
+
(ks2 + k′s2) and

ks2 + k′s2
− ks1, and sends them to the second
client and the cloud, respectively. The client then computes and
sends k2 −

ks1 + k′s1
 + (ks2 + k′s2) to the cloud. By using
both values sent by the client and server, the cloud updates the
biometric database as follows:
Enc 2
i=1
ki+ks2+k′s2
(m1) = Enck1+ks1+k′s1 (m1)
+ Enck2−(ks1+k′s1)+(ks2+k′s2)(0), (4)
Enc 2
i=1
ki+ks2+k′s2
(m2) = Enck2 (m2)+ Encks1+k′s1(0)
+ Enc(ks2+k′s2)−ks1(0). (5)
Note that biometric data m1 and m2 were earlier encrypted
using different keys. However, they are now encrypted with
the same key. After updating the database, the cloud initiates
a secure channel to update its key. First, the cloud generates a
random number vector rc and sends k1 + ks1 + rc to the server,
which deletes ks1 and adds ks2. Next, k1 + ks2 + rc is sent tothe second client. The client adds his key k2 and finally sends
the result to the cloud. By subtracting rc, the cloud updates its
key. Simultaneously, the server revokes the key pair (ks2, k′s2).
The cloud then uses
2
i=1 ki + ks2 + k′s2 as a key. By iterating
this process for n number of clients, the cloud has encrypted
FingerCodes as follows:
Enc n
i=1
ki+ksn+k′sn
(m1) ,
...
Enc n
i=1
ki+ksn+k′sn
(mn) .
The second client enrollment process is shown in Fig. 3.
3.4. Secure biometric identification
To make an identification request, the client generates a new
random key kc and encrypts −mc. Then, Enckc (−mc) is sent
directly to the cloud, which then adds a new random number
vector r to it. The server obtains the result and computes
Enckc−k′sn (r − mc) by simply adding the negative value of its
key k′sn . The client computes Enc−k′sn (r − mc) by subtracting
his key kc, and sends the result to the cloud. The cloud first
subtracts r and computes Euclidean distances between the
biometric database and candidate data.
Enc n
i=1
ki+ksn+k′sn
(m1)+ Enc−k′sn (−mc)
= Enc n
i=1
ki+ksn
(m1 − mc) , (6)
...
Enc n
i=1
ki+ksn+k′sn
(mn)+ Enc−k′sn (−mc)
= Enc n
i=1
ki+ksn
(mn − mc) . (7)
As shown in Eqs. (6) and (7), the result is now encrypted by the
cloud’s secret key. By decrypting the result, the cloud obtains
m j − mc

, where 1 ≤ j ≤ n. To compare the Euclidean
distances between two FingerCodes, the cloud computes the
distance as follows:
dist

m j ,mc
 = x j1 − xc12 + · · · + (xk N − xcN )2. (8)
By computing all distances, the cloud locates the smallest
distance distmin , and sends it to the server to verify whether
the client is legitimate by using some threshold, that is, if
distmin ≤ threshold, the client is identified successfully.
4. Analysis
4.1. Security analysis
In this subsection, we demonstrate that the proposed scheme
is secure. First, we assume that the attacker can be a valid client
and send an identification request to the server and cloud. In
138 C. Hahn, J. Hur / ICT Express 2 (2016) 135–139Fig. 4. Time cost for enrollment phase for different database sizes.
Fig. 5. Time cost for identification time for different database sizes.
addition, the cloud may collude with clients to harvest the raw
FingerCode data in the database.
To harvest a client’s FingerCode mk , the cloud should
determine the value r j , where 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Specifically, we
have an encrypted form ck = [(xk1 + r1 mod M), . . . , (xk N
+ rN mod M)]; then, the cloud has the following N equations:
xk1 + r1 = ck1, (9)
...
xk N + rN = ck N . (10)
The cloud cannot learn the FingerCode because there are 2N
unknown variables, and it only knows N equations.
In case of collusion between the cloud and a set of malicious
clients, the database encryption key is the sum of all clients’
keys
n
i=1 ki and server’s key pair (ksn, k′sn). Even if a number
of clients collude with the cloud, the partial sum of the
malicious clients’ key cannot facilitate the cloud in guessing the
value
n
i=1 ki + ksn + k′sn . To harvest the client’s private data,
the key k′sn is required, which cannot be obtained by the cloud.
Therefore, the proposed scheme is secure against malicious
entities.4.2. Performance analysis
We implemented the proposed scheme to evaluate the ac-
tual performance. We programmed our proposed system by us-
ing the Java language on a Linux instance in the Amazon EC2
cloud [8] to analyze practicality of the proposed scheme in
cloud computing. In order to construct the practical biomet-
ric identification scheme, we set up five databases with dif-
ferent sizes. The Amazon EC2 cloud consists of one instance
node with 2.5 GHz Intel E5-2670v2 CPU and 1GiB memory.
The cloud instance runs Linux with low I/O performance. We
generated five databases with 640-elements contained in Fin-
gerCode data. To the best of our knowledge, the scheme by
Yuan et al. [6] is the most recent and fastest among the existing
schemes. Therefore, we implemented this biometric identifica-
tion scheme to compare with our scheme.
As shown in Fig. 4, the enrollment time reaches 40 min for
a 256 MB database, and increases linearly with the size of the
database. With a 4 GB database, 10.4 h are needed for database
enrollment. Meanwhile, the scheme by Yuan et al. [6] requires
48 min at 256 MB and 12.15 h at 4 GB. Both schemes show rel-
atively similar performance results in the enrollment phase even
though we exploited the additively homomorphic encryption
scheme that uses only simple addition and modulation, while
Yuan et al. used matrix operations which cause heavy computa-
tional overhead. This is because our scheme requires scanning
of an entire database for each client enrollment, thus requiring
more computation in the cloud. Nevertheless, the enrollment
process is performed only once during the service.
When the client sends an identification request, our scheme
shows a great advantage over that by Yuan et al. [6], as shown in
Fig. 5. In a 256 MB database, our scheme needs 7.8 s, whereas
the scheme by Yuan et al. requires 96 s. This difference in-
creases with the size of the database. For example, for 256 MB
and 4 GB databases, our scheme needs only 15 s and 2 min,
respectively. In contrast, the scheme by Yuan et al. requires 96
s and 22 min for 256 MB and 4 GB databases. Such perfor-
mance gap is caused because we only use O(N ) operations over
an entire database with N -element FingerCode data, whereas
the scheme by Yuan et al. needs O(N 2) computations because
of the utilization of the matrix operation. Thus, the proposed
scheme outperforms that of Yuan et al. during client identifica-
tion, demonstrating that the proposed scheme is approximately
11 times faster.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an efficient and privacy-
preserving biometric identification scheme in cloud computing.
Unlike in previous studies, we allow no entities except the
client to access the client’s biometric data. The security analysis
shows that the biometric data is not disclosed to the server and
cloud. By leveraging the additively homomorphic encryption,
we securely outsource the client biometric identification to the
cloud. Moreover, the performance analysis and experimental
results show that our scheme outperforms the previous schemes
in terms of computation and communication.
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